‘Chile believes an Argentine default, devaluation or a combination of both is inevitable’
Interview to Luis Lagos (Instituto de Economía, Universidad Católica de Chile)
Jul-27-01

Much has been said in Chile –through the Interior Minister the government made hard statements- about the impact of the Argentine crisis in growth prospects. What is your opinion?

Chile’s concerns are serious because as we have seen in the past, when a country is in trouble the herd effect may be huge. It occurred in the Asian crisis, in Russia and so if Argentina encountered troubles with its debt or a possible default or if it decided to devalue its currency, the region would be shaken by the impact. So far the effects have materialized in soaring exchange volatility but if something like that should happen, I guess the region would be in trouble due to a dwindling financing availability for all countries.
 


‘If the United States recovers
slowly, the growth rate for
2001 may drop to 3%’.

But Chile, on the other hand, has managed to break away from the group of emerging nations, is that right?

Certainly, in fact, today Chile enjoys an improved situation in terms of country-risk between 180 and 200 basic points. It reports the lowest risk in Latin America and of all emerging countries it must be one of the lowest along with Hungary. However, Chile’s internal political situation has worsened compared to the ‘90s: growth has slowed, unemployment is higher and remains high. So greater volatility in the region could be detrimental to this and next year’s growth rate.

Chile intends to become a US trading partner but a Southern Cone crisis may give rise to two hypotheses about its image abroad: it may be viewed as ‘stronger’ than its neighbors and so with greater possibilities to join the NAFTA or may be regarded as part of an unstable region. In your opinion, which of these view would prevail?

Hard to know. People who in the United States oppose the NAFTA enlargement or that Chile should sign a bilateral trade deal with the US, will surely favor the second view: if the region is unstable, it is not convenient to enlarge the treaty toward this spot of the world where instability is almost chronic. So that would be the banner of many people who oppose free trade with the United States.


‘Chile reports the lowest risk in Latin America but the internal economic situation
has worsened compared to the ‘90s: growth has slowed down and unemployment is higher’.

By contrast, the other point also hold true. People who support Chile’s entry to the treaty might suggest –following the Free Trade Initiative of the Americas launched by former President Bush Sr- that a good starting point would be the nation which stands out as stronger within the Southern Cone or Latin America. Both points may be used by both sides depending on how the matter is solved in Congress.

Among the economic decision-makers in Chile today, are those who forecast an Argentine default a majority?

Unfortunately I’d say yes. The situation in Argentina is quite hard and so a default, devaluation or a combination of both is believed to be the only solution. While it is true that the zero deficit plan announced by Argentine officials is stringent, it is apparent they find it hard to implement it. The debate in the heart of Congress reflects the lack of political will to conduct a financial adjustment of that sort. Who will pay for the adjustment: that is the question. What we see from here is that Argentina’s chronic problem is of fiscal nature and the signal to the rest of the world is that the country has been incapable of sustaining a fiscal situation for some time.

In numbers, what are today’s growth prospects for Chile and in what way have the changed lately?

Since early this year prospects have varied from 4% to 3.5%, which is what most analysts estimate today. This percentage could be lower if the situation gets definitely worse. And if the United States recovers more slowly –trade relations with Argentina are not very relevant anyway – I guess the growth rate for 2001 may decline to 3%.


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