This stance advances along interesting paths such as leaving aside the party that placed him on power to restore the military logy that originally launched the failed coup (against Carlos Andrés Pérez’ administration) on February 4, 1992 which later turned into a political-military structure totally inspired by the ceresolian model as some experts say; and the current creation of the ‘Bolivarian revolutionary circles’ as opposed to the ‘Bolivarian patriotic circles’ Interior Minister Luis Miquilena was mounting.

The main reason is that Chávez is truly confident that the radicalization will allow him to regain ground in terms of popular support exacerbating the most visceral affections of a messianic figure. To that end, he finds it essential to radicalize his discourse. However, that is not enough unless it is accompanied by a number of organizational decisions such as the MBR refunding and the Bolivarian revolutionary process, that serve him as popular support toward that process of radicalization. This leaves aside what is considered as ‘the moderate wing of Chavism’ represented by the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) and within it the wing responding to Minister Miquilena.

All this has intensified in recent days. The need to turn Montesinos in has caused substantial changes in the political scenes against early June.

The decisions taken in terms of freedom of speech are very serious. And if you relate this to the above-mentioned facts –the radicalization of his discourse, mounting movements that emulate the Cuban revolutionary defense committees- and add the attack against freedom of speech, the educational plan, the next-to-come media content act and the lands act, we are heading towards a project becoming more radical in terms of authoritarianism.

But there’s a particular element in Venezuela and is an increasingly active civil society reflecting all the advantages of many years of democracy that is willing to voice its opinion. This places us in a different situation than that of other Latin American countries.

In Venezuela, the traditional political parties have imploded: we have new parties and old parties trying to streamline their structures and at the same time we should acknowledge the existence of a large inorganic mass protesting for punctual facts that manages to join forces when something like freedom of expression is at stake as we have observed in the last two weeks.

The possibilities for politics to have a negative impact on the economy are high. We have experienced considerable capital flights lately, precisely due to political uncertainty. There is deep concern among economic and financial groups, especially considering a drop –that does not have to be substantial- in the oil price that place the Venezuelan barrel at 20-22 dollars. This would place the government against a wall when it comes to honoring the undertaken commitment with public employees and trade unions. Right now it finds it difficult to honor partly due to financial reasons and partly due to lack of aptitude. If we add the radicalization of the discourse and a slight growth of the non-oil sector, you may well understand the political over the economic game has a major role. Unbalanced in terms of space.

Traditionally, the US-Venezuela relationship has been quite good but we have been experienced some important comprehension difficulties in the last two years. I believe the Montesinos affaire is complicating this fact even more to which we should add Venezuela’s isolation fueled by its Andean neighbors and countless unanswered questions in the subregion that resound in the United States. The uncertainties increase as to the short and mid-term future of a country that is totally paralyzed because everything changes at lightning speed and the world depends on every word the President of the Republic says.

The unpredictability will continue. This is the only forecast I dare make.