The Palestine bombings and Israeli retaliation of recent weeks tend to obscure rather than clarify the central questions of the Levantine conflict. The easy task is to take part and blame one of the parties for all the evils of a conflict which is ultimately thousand years old. But despite the apparent obscurity, the latest events clearly show the status of the conflict and its complex reality.

The first illustrative point is the nature of the Israeli retaliation last December 4. In response to three suicide attacks that killed dozens of Israelis, Ariel Sharon’s government dispatched a squad of helicopters to destroy Yasser Arafat’s air fleet and damage the Gaza city airport, which is daily used by the leader of Palestine. Had they intended to kill the Palestinian leader, Israelis wouldn’t have missed the target. However, the nature of their targets suggests that Israelis wanted to send a strong message: it is time to resume control of its armies before these eat them alive.

Recent debates both in the Israeli and American administrations have moved toward reconsidering Yasser Arafat as Palestinian leader. The most radical figures in both governments have been arguing for months that it was high time to find a more reliable counterpart, one capable of reaching an agreement averting situations like one year ago when Arafat rejected the biggest and most ambitious offer ever made to him and perhaps one that should never repeat. Instead of demanding all besieged territories in response, he gave green light to a new wave of terrorism, overlooking the huge predicament in would end up in.

Fortunately, the coldest minds have prevailed asking what would happen should Arafat disappear instead of looking back. The most recent bombings were not launched by Arafat’s forces (which he controls increasingly less) but by the radical Islamic Hamas organization which intends to destroy the state of Israel. Unlike Arafat, who has been trying to find a solution with Israel through the United States for years, Hamas’ explicit objective is to destroy the State of Israel. In this sense, Hamas resembles Bin Laden while Arafat is exactly the opposite. The problem is he has proved to be a weak leader, incapable of reaching an agreement and implementing it.

The bombs placed by Hamas aimed at undermining the power of the Palestinian leader. Every time there is a terrorist attack to which Israelis respond, Araft loses credibility as counterpart with Israel and as intermediary with the United States. At the same time, in the absence of concrete solutions or at least real progress in negotiations as happened in the mid-‘90s, Arafat has nothing to offer to his own bases, which debilitates his viability as leader among Palestinians.

The quandary is quite serious for Arafat has failed to deliver on his promises and make the most of good opportunities. But it is crystal clear that there is not an easy alternative for Israelis or Americans, that is why the Israeli retaliation was mainly symbolic though it looked massive. But the underlying problem is that the Palestinian phenomenon is quickly shifting from its nationalist and secular nature to more Islamic religious hues. Against this background, the systematic proneness to waste opportunities is truly terrifying. Unless this problem is quickly solved, which will surely entail abandoning all territories besieged in Cisjordan and Gaza in 1967, the present will only be a child’s game compared to what may come.