Studying the October 14 electoral outcome shows a clear PJ victory winning in 17 of the 24 districts and preserving the absolute majority in the Senate becoming the leading force with a comfortable margin in the Lower House.

On national average, the PJ seized around 33 to 36% of votes issued according to provisory data. It is not so different an outcome as the one obtained in the 1997 legislative election (36%) and in 1999 (33%). Back then the party lost the national election for deputies by 10 and 11 points respectively against the Alliance while now with a similar percentage it leads 10 points ahead the national average.

The explanation is simple: the Alliance which in 1997 won the legislative elections with 46% and 44% two years ago has now descended to less than half losing more than 20 points. This explains why the PJ with a similar percentage to the one obtained in the last election of the ‘90s now scores a landslide victory when was then clearly defeated.

Since then, the 2001 election marks the end of the Alliance as a politico-social coalition –despite its official presence- and this allows the PJ to undertake the role of leading electoral force standing as an alternative for the 2003 presidential election.

The progressist or center-left vote no longer favors the Alliance and has largely opted for dissident factions such as ARI and Polo Social or left-leaning forces as was the case in the Capital city or blank or void votes.

The case of the province of Buenos Aires is a clear example of this phenomenon. The PJ scores a landslide victory with 37%, the same percentage of its defeat two years ago and 3 points behind the 40% it seized in 1997 when the Alliance won by 6 points with Fernández Meijide’s candidacy.

The explanation is analogous: the Alliance which four years ago seized 46% in the province and 43% in 1999 has now plummeted to 15%, an almost 30-point drop. This allows the PJ to score now the same percentage of its past defeat.

This situation confirms that beyond major political and social changes experienced by Argentina -the unprecedented percentages of blank and void votes in this election proves that- it must be noted the PJ is only defeated when a wide electoral coalition is mounted against it seizing around 50% of votes. This happened in 1983 with Alfonsín and in 1999 with the Alliance.

The PJ has showed once more its high degree of electoral loyalty among popular sectors clearly underscored by provincial governors’ administrations that seems to stand for the ‘spinal cord’ represented by trade unions decades ago.

The Federal Capital –undoubtedly an atypical district in Argentina’s politics- shows the same phenomenon though the other way around. The radical-progressist vote can only be defeated when this coalition breaks up and the center-right-PJ joins as happened in 1993 when the PJ won in the district.

This is what would have happened should Béliz and Liendo’s slates had joined against the segmentation that sent the Alliance falling from 55 and 52% garnered in the last election to only 21% due to the ARI emergence, the growth of left-leaning forces and the increase in blank and void votes.

To conclude, the PJ has clearly won the national election and for the first time the opposition will control both Houses apart from most governorships. This victory resulted from the Alliance’s shaking condition that from a true PJ growth. However, this party has showed a considerable ability to retain votes in extreme social conditions and being –along with the left- the force least affected by the increased negative votes.